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Executive functions are the high-level 
cognitive processes that facilitate new 
ways of behaving, and optimise one’s 
approach to unfamiliar circumstances. 
As many situations in everyday life are 
not exactly the same as ones that we 
have encountered before, it follows that 
the operation of executive processes 
accompanies a very wide range of 
behaviours. But we particularly engage 
such processes when, for instance, we 
make a plan for the future, or voluntarily 
switch from one activity to another, 
or resist temptation; in other words, 
whenever we do many of the things 
that allow us to lead independent, 
purposeful lives. These processes are 
thought to be supported, at least in part, 
by structures within the frontal lobes 
of the brain. But they are understood 
far less comprehensively than some of 
the functions supported by other brain 
regions. Indeed, a review published as 
recently as 1996 described this domain 
as a “somewhat embarrassing zone 
of almost total ignorance” (Monsell, 
1996). But cognitive neuroscience 
has recently made significant strides 
in characterising the nature of these 
processes, and their underlying brain 
mechanisms. This Primer surveys some 
of the theoretical frameworks commonly 
used for understanding executive 
functions, and their relationship with the 
frontal lobes.
Role of executive processes  
in the organisation of cognition
At the heart of most (but not all) 
theories of executive function is a 
distinction, or gradation, between 
routine (or ‘automatic’) and non- routine 
(or ‘controlled’) processing. Routine 
processing refers to mental operations 
that are well rehearsed or overlearned, 
for example reading out a word. By 
contrast, non- routine processing most 
commonly refers to mental operations 
that are used in situations when  
there is not a well-established 
stimulus-response association, or 
where a behavioural impasse has 
occurred (for example one notices an 
error, or realises that one is behaving 
in a sub-optimal fashion). The term 
‘executive functions’ has become 
Primer synonymous with those behaviours and abilities.
At an abstract level of processing, 
least tied to routine behaviour, are 
flexible representations of goals 
and intentions. Such ‘higher-level’ 
representations are often contrasted 
with ‘lower-level’ cognitive processes 
involved in analysing specific 
perceptual inputs (such as visual 
processing of stimuli such as ‘BLUE’) 
and generating specific motor outputs 
(such as vocal responses). According 
to most theories, executive function 
entails the modulation of lower-level 
processes by those at a higher level. 
Depending on our current goal, we 
are able to modulate lower-level 
perceptual-analysis and  
speech-output processes in order 
to produce appropriate behaviour. In 
different contexts we might ignore the 
word, read it out, or name its colour, 
even though we are presented with the 
same perceptual input in each case. 
Thus, executive functions allow us 
to behave flexibly, rather than being 
slaves to our environment and always 
behaving in a stereotyped manner 
when particular events occur. This 
equips us with the ability to adapt to 
novel, or changing, situations.
The modulation of various cognitive, 
perceptual, and motor processes 
according to abstract goals and 
intentions is commonly referred to 
as ‘top-down control’. However, this 
should not imply a strict unidirectional 
influence from higher-level to 
lower- level processes. Instead, the role 
of executive function in cognition is 
probably more accurately considered 
in terms of continual interaction 
between higher- and lower-level 
processes. Higher-level processes are 
commonly triggered in everyday life 
by conflicts between representations 
or inputs at lower levels, for instance 
when something unexpected occurs 
or when behaviour does not have the 
usual consequences.
Paradigms in executive  
function research
Historically, a major obstacle to 
progress in research into executive 
function has been the difficulty of 
quantifying the processes supported 
by the human frontal lobes, a 
problem compounded by the variety 
of cognitive, social, and emotional 
changes that have been reported to 
occur as a consequence of damage 
to this region. Methodological and 
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forty years, however, have established 
links between performance of certain 
paradigms which putatively make 
demands upon executive processes 
and the operation of prefrontal cortex, 
as assessed by human lesion studies, 
functional neuroimaging, and other 
methods (such as electrophysiology). 
There are many such tasks that 
can be used in work on humans: the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, the Tower 
of London test, the Trail-Making Test 
and the Hayling Sentence Completion 
Test, to name but a few. What these 
tasks generally have in common 
is that they require processing 
beyond the instantiation of a single 
set of well- learned or directly cued 
associations between stimuli and 
responses. This may be, for instance, 
because they require: overcoming 
the tendency to enact strong 
stimulus–response associations that 
are currently not relevant (‘inhibition’); 
remembering and manipulating 
information over delay periods, 
especially in the face of interference 
(‘working memory’); switching 
between two or more alternative 
stimulus– response mappings 
(‘flexibility’); ‘(self-)initiation’, because 
there is an absence of external cues 
to prompt behaviour; development 
of a novel strategy or approach 
(‘strategy application’); or control of 
novel behavioural sequences over 
long periods of time (‘multitasking’ or 
‘prospective memory’, for example).
Similar progress has been made in 
work on animals, except that in this 
case work has largely concentrated 
on tasks that have the first three 
characteristics. It is now clear that the 
dynamics of these types of paradigm 
are complex, and that many other 
brain regions are involved in their 
performance. Moreover, the prefrontal 
cortex, especially in humans, probably 
supports many abilities that have 
so far received scant attention (for 
example, aspects of social behaviour 
or creativity). But the development 
of these procedures has opened up 
the possibility of objective evaluation 
of what once seemed scientifically 
intractable. Consequently, the field is 
currently one of the fastest growing in 
cognitive neuroscience.
Theoretical accounts of executive 
function
Patients with frontal lobe damage 
may present with a wide range Sensory information Schemas Response systems
Supervisory system
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Figure 1. The ‘Supervisory System’ model of executive functions. 
According to this model, behaviour is controlled by schemas, which may appropriately be trig-
gered by incoming perceptual information in routine situations; but in non-routine situations, the 
executive functions of the Supervisory System are called upon to modulate their level of activity. 
The Supervisory System is now thought to be composed of multiple, interacting, sub-systems. 
This illustration is based particularly on the framework put forward by Norman and Shallice 
(see Shallice, 1988). However, other frameworks, such as those presented by Duncan (2001) 
and Miller and Cohen (2001) have strong similarities.of symptoms, which can occur in 
combination or singly. For this reason, 
many accounts of the organisation 
of the executive system have 
concentrated on finding principles that 
might explain, simultaneously, one or 
more of these symptoms. For instance, 
impulsivity and a failure to pursue 
goals over long periods of time are 
amongst the most common difficulties 
reported after frontal lobe damage. 
But, in other situations, frontal lobe 
damage can cause ‘perseveration’ (an 
inability to switch to a new behaviour 
when the previous one becomes 
inappropriate). How can these 
apparently contradictory patterns  
be reconciled?
Norman and Shallice put forward an 
influential framework for understanding 
executive function that can potentially 
account for both of these findings 
(Figure 1). According to this framework, 
behaviour is governed by sets of 
thought or action ‘schemas’. A schema 
is a set of actions or cognitions that 
have become very closely associated 
through practice. These schemas can 
become activated in two distinct ways. 
First, they can be triggered by events 
in one’s environment. For example, 
when driving, the schema to brake 
can be triggered by the sight of a red 
light (if you are an experienced driver). 
Environmental triggering of schemas 
can be sufficient to accomplish 
appropriate behaviour in routine situations involving well-learned links 
between particular events in our 
environment and particular ways of 
behaving. However, in other situations, 
such as those involving novelty or 
where well-learned responses need to 
be inhibited, environmental triggering 
is inadequate and a second system 
is required to modulate the activity 
level of schemas. Norman and Shallice 
label this the ‘supervisory system’ and 
suggest that it is supported by the 
frontal lobes of the brain.
In some situations, environmental 
triggers lead to the activation of one 
schema, but an alternative schema 
needs to be selected. In these 
situations, damage to the supervisory 
system will make it more likely that the 
previously relevant schema, triggered 
by environmental events, will continue 
to be selected, leading to excessive 
behavioural rigidity. In other situations, 
where the task in hand is not strongly 
cued by environmental events, a 
reduction in supervisory input may 
lead to the triggering of inappropriate 
behaviour by salient objects in the 
environment, leading to excessive 
distractability. Thus, damage to the 
supervisory system could explain 
excessive rigidity, and also excessive 
distractibility, both of which have been 
reported to occur following damage to 
the frontal lobes.
Various other frameworks for 
understanding executive function 
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Figure 2. Gross architecture of human prefrontal cortex (PFC). 
The lateral surface is split into a ventrolateral region (VLPFC), dorsolateral region (DLPFC) and 
rostral region (RPFC). The medial surface (MPFC) is illustrated as a single region, but recent 
studies indicate considerable anatomical and functional variation within this region as well.have also been put forward. For 
instance, some theorists (John 
Duncan, for example) emphasise 
the malleability of high-level 
representations, which vary according 
to current task demands. This is 
consistent with observations from 
single-cell recording studies with 
awake, behaving monkeys. Whatever 
arbitrary task the monkey has 
been trained to perform, cells are 
typically found, particularly within 
the lateral prefrontal cortex, that 
respond selectively to task- relevant 
information. This indicates a 
remarkable ability of the prefrontal 
cortex to adapt its functions to the 
current task. Other theorists (Jordan 
Grafman, for example) emphasise that 
high-level representations need to 
be learned (governing, for example, 
the appropriate set of responses 
associated with temporally extended 
events such as visiting a restaurant). 
Despite these differences in emphasis, 
there is a great deal of consensus 
that executive function involves 
higher-level processes modulating 
lower-level ones according to current 
task demands, so that our behaviour 
is not always driven by immediate 
environmental triggers.
Can executive function  
be fractionated?
Executive function is an umbrella term, 
referring to those high-level processes 
that control and organise other mental 
processes. But can such processes be 
divided into distinct subprocesses —  
in other words, can the putative 
‘supervisory system’ be fractionated? 
Two questions might be asked here. 
First, at a behavioural level, can the different cognitive processes that 
come under the rubric of ‘executive 
function’ be separated? And second, 
can it be shown that different parts 
of the frontal lobes support distinct 
aspects of executive function? 
Although these questions were once 
controversial, it is now known that the 
answer to both is unequivocally yes.
Behavioural studies show that, 
although there are often significant 
positive correlations between 
participants’ scores on various tests of 
executive function, there correlations 
tend to be rather low (typically r < 0.4) 
and often no higher than correlations 
with non-executive tests. Moreover, 
factor analysis reveals the presence 
of multiple distinct factors in scores 
derived from batteries of executive 
function tests. It therefore seems 
unlikely that executive function refers 
to a single, undifferentiated cognitive 
process. There are many other sources 
of supporting evidence. For instance, 
damage to different frontal lobe brain 
regions has differential effects on 
various executive function tests, and 
neuroimaging studies have shown that 
engagement of different aspects of 
executive function are accompanied 
by haemodynamic changes in different 
parts of the frontal lobes. 
Executive function and the brain
The frontal lobes, and particularly the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC), are well-placed 
for a role in high-level modulation 
of lower-level processes supported 
by posterior brain regions. Along 
with rich interconnections within 
its subregions, the PFC sends and 
receives projections from virtually 
all major sensory and motor cortical systems, with access to highly 
processed multi-modal sensory 
information represented in higher-order 
sensory regions. There are also strong 
interconnections between the PFC 
and subcortical structures, such as 
the basal ganglia. The PFC is thus well 
placed to integrate diverse, high-level 
representations, and to exert control 
over various brain systems. 
It is now commonly accepted 
that patterns of activity within PFC 
represent current behavioural context 
and/or current goals and intentions, 
and that these representations 
can bias processing in posterior 
sensory and motor brain regions. 
However, the PFC is a very large 
region, with considerable variation in 
cytoarchitecture and connectivity. In 
what ways do the roles of different 
prefrontal regions differ?
Mapping function to structure
Determining the relative contributions 
of different frontal subregions to 
different executive functions is a highly 
complex matter, both theoretically 
and methodologically. On current 
evidence, however, one can make 
some preliminary suggestions. 
Figure 2 illustrates some of the major 
subdivisions of the human PFC, which 
may be divided into lateral and medial 
surfaces. On the lateral surface, the 
PFC may be further subdivided into 
ventrolateral, dorsolateral, and rostral 
regions. Although the medial PFC is 
depicted as a single area in Figure 2, 
there is now strong evidence that this 
part of PFC can also be subdivided 
both on cytoarchitectonic and 
functional grounds.
Ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC) is thought 
to be involved in comparatively simple 
tasks, such as short-term maintenance 
of information that cannot currently 
be perceived in ‘working memory’ (for 
example, memorising a phone number 
you have just been told, before keying 
the numbers into a telephone). It has 
also been proposed — although this is 
controversial — that different parts of 
the VLPFC are used to store different 
types of information (for example, the 
sound of a word versus its meaning). 
By contrast, dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) 
has been most commonly implicated 
not so much in maintaining information 
that is no longer available in our 
environment, but in manipulating that 
information. For example, although 
DLPFC is probably not involved in 
processes such as remembering a 
Magazine
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play a role in more difficult tasks, such 
as dialling the number in reverse order 
(rearranging the digits that we have 
just been told). DLPFC has also been 
suggested to be involved in complex 
functions such as making plans  
for the future.
A brain region with strong 
projections to and from the DLPFC is 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 
part of the medial PFC. One influential 
theory proposes that this brain region 
detects the need for control, for 
example where there is competition 
between two or more ways of behaving 
in a certain situation, both of which 
may be triggered by events in our 
environment, requiring top-down input 
to resolve the conflict. It is suggested 
that the ACC does not itself provide 
higher-level modulation of lower- level 
processes, but instead signals to 
DLPFC when such higher-level 
modulation is required. For example, 
in functional neuroimaging studies of 
the Stroop task, where participants 
must respond to the colour of the 
word rather than what it says, activity 
in ACC is greater for stimuli such as 
BLUE (where there is conflict between 
the two dimensions), compared with 
stimuli such as BLUE (which does not 
induce conflict between word- reading 
and colour- naming tendencies, 
and is therefore less dependent on 
higher- level control). This theory 
is attractive because it offers the 
beginnings of an explanation of how 
the PFC ‘knows’ when it is required to 
exert top-down control on other brain 
regions, and it has been implemented 
in explicit computational modelling 
studies. But it is controversial because, 
although it is consistent with much 
data from neuroimaging, patients  
with damage to the ACC often  
perform well on tasks that require the 
detection of conflict.
The largest, but most mysterious, 
sub-region of prefrontal cortex is the 
rostral PFC (RPFC). As a proportion 
of whole-brain volume, some have 
estimated the human RPFC to be twice 
as large as the corresponding region 
in the chimpanzee brain. Yet curiously, 
patients with damage restricted to the 
RPFC often perform well on standard 
neuropsychological tests, including 
‘classical’ tests of executive function 
such as the Wisconsin card sorting 
test. Instead, patients with damage 
to this region seem to have particular 
difficulty in real-world ‘multitasking’ Performing two or more tasks together
Episodic memory retrieval
Reflecting on one’s own or others’ mental states
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Figure 3. Functional specialisation within rostral prefrontal cortex (RPFC). 
This illustration represents the results of a recent meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging 
studies reporting activation within RPFC. Until recently this was considered by many as a func-
tionally homogenous region, but these results indicate that different parts tend to be activated, 
depending on which of these three categories of task was being performed. (Adapted from 
Gilbert, S.J., Spengler, S., Simons, J.S., Steele, J.D., Lawrie, S.M., Frith, C.D., and Burgess, P.W. 
(2006). Functional specialization within rostral prefrontal cortex (area 10): A meta-analysis. J. 
Cogn. Neurosci. 18, 932-48.)situations, such as organising a 
shopping trip when there are few 
strict constraints — participants 
are relatively free to organise their 
behaviour however they like — but 
there are also multiple instructions to 
be remembered, rules to be followed, 
and potential distractions in the 
environment. Recent accounts have 
focused on the role of RPFC in the 
most high-level human abilities, such 
as combining two distinct cognitive 
operations in order to perform a single 
task, trying to work out what other 
people are thinking (‘mentalising’), 
and reflecting on information we 
retrieve from long-term memory 
(‘source memory’, for example trying 
to work out when we last saw a 
person familiar to us). We recently put 
forward the unifying hypothesis that 
this brain region serves as a ‘gateway’ 
between cognitive processes directed 
towards current incoming perceptual 
information, versus information that 
we generate ourselves. We have 
also shown by a meta-analysis of 
functional neuroimaging results that 
there are distinct functions associated 
with different parts of the RPFC, with 
segregation especially between lateral 
versus medial regions, and between 
rostral versus caudal regions (Figure 3). 
Conclusions
There is clearly much more to learn 
about the prefrontal cortex, and 
the executive functions it supports. We are very far from having a full 
understanding of its functional 
architecture. For instance, although 
many distinctions have been 
reported between the functions of 
homologous regions in the left and 
right hemisphere, laterality effects 
are still relatively poorly understood. 
And relatively little is known of the 
functions of prefrontal cortex in 
explicit computational terms. In other 
words, we may know that a particular 
region of prefrontal cortex supports a 
particular ability, but not necessarily 
how. Nevertheless, recent research 
combining single-cell recording, 
neuroimaging, neuropsychological, 
computational modelling, and 
meta-analytic techniques has led 
to considerable advances in our 
understanding of executive function. 
In particular, we now have a much 
greater understanding of the ways in 
which executive functions can be split 
into various discrete processes, and 
the ways in which prefrontal cortex 
can be split into functionally discrete 
subregions, than we did ten years ago. 
The next ten years are likely to bring 
advances even more rapid than the 
last. This is for at least three reasons. 
First, there has been increasing recent 
interest in the involvement of prefrontal 
cortex in human social cognition, and 
the ways in which this relates to tests 
of executive function. Second, there 
is strong evidence that psychiatric 
conditions such as schizophrenia 
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signatures in their rallies [8], and they 
respond more rapidly to the playback 
of strangers than neighbours [8]. 
Neighbours may be viewed as less 
threatening because on winning a 
contest they only invade the loser’s 
territory temporarily to forage and 
examine roost holes [9], but no changes 
in territory boundaries result [10]. In 
contrast, a strange group may take 
over the owner’s territory permanently if 
successful in a contest [11]. 
I recorded allopreening events in 
the hour before and after simulated 
intrusions into the territories of 12 
groups. Each group received two 
playback trials: one of a rally from a 
neighbouring group; the other of a 
rally from a strange group of the same 
size and sex ratio as the neighbouring 
group. I noted the identity of the 
individual donating and receiving each 
bout of allopreening, and also whether 
the bout focused on the head (which 
cannot be reached by the recipient 
itself) or the rest of the body (see 
Supplemental data available on-line 
with this issue for further details).
Intragroup allopreening rates 
increased significantly in the hour 
following simulated intrusions by 
strange groups, but not those by 
neighbours (Figure 1A). There was 
no significant increase in head 
allopreening, but body allopreening 
did increase significantly (Figure 1B), 
supporting the idea that the former 
serves a primarily hygienic function, 
while the latter fulfils a social function 
[7]. The increase in body allopreening 
following the playback of a strange 
group resulted from a significant 
increase in allopreening donation 
by the dominant pair (Figure 1C) to 
subordinate helpers (Figure 1D).
Intragroup allopreening may 
have increased to reduce stress [1], 
although there is no evidence that 
third-party affiliation has this effect [2]. 
And if stress reduction was important, 
the dominant pair might have been 
expected to receive, rather than 
donate, more allopreening, as they 
have the most to lose (a breeding 
position, as well as a territory) if 
a strange group defeats them. 
Alternatively, the dominant pair might 
have been attempting to improve 
affiliative relationships in the group 
and enhance social cohesion [12], 
thus maximising the likelihood that 
subordinate helpers participate in the 
next contest; relative group size is a 
key factor determining the outcome 
Type of threat 
influences 
postconflict 
allopreening in a 
social bird
Andrew N. Radford
In many social species, aggressive 
conflict between individuals in the 
same group (intragroup conflict) is often 
followed by increased allogrooming 
(when one individual grooms another) 
involving the protagonists and their 
relatives [1,2]. Although conflict 
between groups (intergroup conflict) 
is also common (see [3]), there has 
been little consideration of its impact 
on intragroup affiliative behaviour (see 
[4] for an exception). Moreover, there 
has been no investigation of whether 
the different threat posed by different 
rival groups (for example, neighbours 
and strangers [5]) influences the level 
of subsequent affiliative behaviour. 
Experiments using playbacks to 
simulate territorial intrusions by 
green woodhoopoes (Phoeniculus 
purpureus), reported here, show that 
intragroup allopreening — the avian 
equivalent of allogrooming — increases 
significantly in response to strange 
groups, but not neighbouring groups, 
and that the increase is due to more 
allopreening of subordinate helpers 
by the dominant pair. This is the first 
experimental evidence for an influence 
of intergroup conflict on intragroup 
affiliative behaviour, and lends support 
to the recent idea that intragroup 
cooperation should increase most when 
the intergroup threat is highest [6].
Green woodhoopoes provide 
an ideal opportunity to investigate 
how the type of threat posed by 
rival groups influences intragroup 
affiliative behaviour. First, allopreening 
is a common and easily scored 
affiliative behaviour [7]. Second, 
groups frequently engage in obvious 
territorial contests, which involve the 
combined cackling of adult group 
members (‘rallies’) [3], and allopreening 
increases following these contests 
(my unpublished data). Third, green 
woodhoopoes can discriminate 
between rivals using group-specific 
Correspondenceand developmental disorders such as autism involve disruption of executive 
function (in ways that may distinguish 
one group from another). Finally, 
it is known that prefrontal cortex 
matures relatively slowly, with some 
parts continuing to develop through 
adolescence and into adulthood. The 
consequences of this for fields such as 
education are only just beginning to be 
explored. Thus new developments in 
the field promise to transform the way 
that we understand the highest levels 
of human cognition, its disorders, and 
development.
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